OBJECTIVITY  IN CIVIL SERVICE ORAL EXAMINATIONS by unknown
collective bargaining do not demand that the property rights of individual
union members be sacrificed to the extent which may occur under the rules
accepted by the courts. A faith-breaking parent should not be allowed to
claim the local funds by virtue of forfeiture provisions contained in the char-
ter; nor should a few self-seeking individuals, by remaining in the local, be
able to acquire title to the entire property through the minimum membership
requirements in the charter.4 '
Where the parent has failed to carry out its obligations or where the two-
fold contract contains no specific provision for disposition of local funds on
a majority secession, the courts should impound the funds until the Board
has affirmed the status of the existing bargaining agent or certified a new one.
It should then recognize as the "original" local that group which is certified
by the Board and should grant them the local funds.42  In this manner the
courts can strengthen the union which will represent the workers in future
bargaining with management.
"OBJECTIVITY" IN CIVIL SERVICE ORAL EXAMINATIONS:
INTEGRITY of public administration requires that the appointment and
promotion of personnel be based upon relative merit and fitness.' Accord-
41. Though some courts have said that they were not concerned with the question as
to wheher the local was justified in seceding, see Suffridge v. O'Grady, 84 N.Y.S2d 211,
214 (1948), others have indicated that they took into consideration the question vhether
the parent had deviated from the purposes set forth in the two-fold contract. See State
Council v. National Council, 71 NJ.Eq. 433, 465, 64 Ad. 561, 573 (Ch. 1906) (where the
parent in violation of the charter inserted an "insurance clause" therein, the court said
that it might perhaps have been sufficient grounds in itself to permit a withdrawal by the
majority.)
42. Where a local is comprised of workers from more than one plant, a secession
movement may be followed by certification of the loyal group in one plant and the
seceders in another. In that rare event the soundest policy would be to divide the funds
among the groups certified in each plant, adopting as the basis of division the total local
membership in each plant prior to the secession.
If neither the seceding majority nor the loyal minority is selected as the collective bar-
gaining agent the court should give the funds to the seceding majority both where the
parent has not been faithful to the two-fold contract, and where there is no e.\press pro-
vision regarding disposition of funds on secession.
Where the union concerned does not come under the jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Board the courts should attempt to coordinate their policy with that of the
state labor relations board.
* Almassy v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission, 89 Adv. Cal. App. 295,
200 P.2d 846 (1948), hearing granted, 33 Adv. Cal. Rep. No. 15, Min. p. 2, Cal. Sup. Ct.,
Feb. 17, 1949.
1. See KLEIN, CivIm SERvicE IN PuBLIC \Vnr.,um 29-40 (1940) ; Pnocrm, Pr:;cr-
PLEs OF PunmLc PERSONNEL ADaIINISTRATION 11-16 (1921). See Allen v. McKinley, 18
Cal.2d 697, 705, 117 P2d 342, 347 (1941). For the argument against a career public
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ingly, when positions in the civil service involve administrative duties or
extensive personal contact, the statutory mandate of open competitive
examinations 2 is implemented by personal interviews. These oral examina-
tions afford an appraisal of character and personality,' thus supplementing
written tests of mental proficiency.
An appreciation of the necessity for civil service oral examinations also
compels recognition of their inherent shortcomings.4 If improperly super-
vised, they pave the way for patronage and discrimination. Aware of the
potentialities for abuse, courts have attempted to establish safeguards for
maintaining fair competition. 5 A recent example is Ahnassy v. Los Angeles
sprvice, but rather favoring limited tenure and rotation in office, see Andrew Jackson's
first annual message to Congress (1829), quoted in WILMERDING, GOVERNMENT BY MERn
18 (1935).
2. This requirement stems from the Civil Service (Pendleton) Act, 22 STAT. 403
(1883), 5 U.S.C. §633(2) (1946), which set up the merit system in the federal govern-
ment. For its early justification, see JENCHES, CIVIL SERVICE OF THE UNITD STAeS
(1867); SHEPARD, The Competitive Test and the Civil Service of States and Cites in
EcONOmic TRAcrs XIV (1884).
A few states have constitutional provisions for open competitive examinations. See
CAI. CONST. Art. XXIV, § 1; COLO. CoNsT. Art. XII, § 13; N. Y. CoNsr. Art V, § 6;
OHIO CoNsT. Art XV, § 10. Usually, however, the requirement is found in statutes and
charters. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 43.09(4) (1946); CLEVELAND CHARTER § 92(b)
(1924). An explicit declaration of intent is found in the ATLANTA CODE § 6-409 (1942) :
"[T]ests may take into consideration elements of character, education, aptitude, experi-
ence, knowledge, skill, personality, physical fitness and other pertinent matters and may
be written or oral." A limitation uniformly imposed is that "All examinations shall be
impartial, and relate only to matters which will test the fitness of the persons examined
for the service they wish to enter. No question shall relate to political or religious opin-
ions or affiliations, and no appointment shall be in any manner affected by such opinions
,or affiliations." DENvER CHARTR § 228 (1927).
For the selection process generally, see FELDMAN, A PERSONNEL PROGRAM FOR Til
FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE 116-8 (1931); KINGSLEY, RECRUITING AI'PLICANTS FOR THE Pun-
LIC SERVICE (1942) (committee report submitted to Civil Service Assembly of the United
States and Canada).
Although the great majority of civil service positions are competitive, certain classes,
notably labor and those of a high-policy-making nature, are often exempted from this
requirement. The trend, however, is toward a completely competitive system. See Exec.
Order No. 7916, 3 FED. RE4. 1526 (1938), extending the competitive classified civil
service.
3. The "oral examination" herein discussed refers only to personality evaluation, as
opposed to an oral test of knowledge.
For an excellent analysis of the problem of civil service oral examinations generally,
see ORDwAY, ORAL TESTS IN PUBLIC PERSONNEL SELECTION (1943) (committee report
submitted to Civil Service Assembly of the United States and Canada), hereinafter cited
as ORDWAY'S REPORT. Also see KLEIN, CIVIL SERvIcE IN PUBLIC WELFARE 152-9 (1940);
MOSHER & KINGSLEY, PUBLIC PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION 213-29 (1941); O'BRImN &
MARENBERG, YOUR FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE 233-47 (1940).
4. See COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON PUBLIC SERVICE PERSONNEL, MINUTES OF EV1-
DENCE 197, 410 (1935) ; MOSHER & KINGSLEY, op.. cit. .sipra note 3, at 213; ORDwAY's RE-
PORT, at 114-20. For the view that oral tests are used far beyond the point warranted by
their value, see ELEMENTS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 563-4 (Marx ed. 1946).
5. See notes 15 and 16 infra.
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County Civil Service Commission,' where a California appellate court out-
lined its requirements for insuring "objectivity" in oral examinations. A
candidate who had failed both the written and oral halves of a promotional
examination for Senior Deputy Probation Officer brought suit challenging
the over-all validity of the oral phase.7 The standard interview procedure
used there consisted of questioning the candidate on the information con-
tained in his application and rating him on education, experience and "per-
sonal fitness." s Although a record of the examiners' comments and ratings
6. 89 Adv.Cal.App. 295, 200 P.2d 846 (1948).
7. Almassy's main contention was that the Commission had no authority to include
an oral evaluation of education, experience and personal fitness, because such was not
within the contemplation of the Charter requirement of "competitive e.-maminations."
Brief for Appellants, p. 3, Almassy v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission, S9
Adv.Cal.App. 295, 200 P.2d 846 (1948). Significantly, no charges of arbitrary, capricious
or fraudulent conduct on the part of the Commission were advanced. Neither ,as there
any indication that the candidate's ratings were at all unreasonable. With efficiency and
seniority credits, and a "boost" obtained on appeal to the Commission, his final grades
were only 61.64% and 64.45% (70% is passing). Indicative of the character of this
candidate was his answer to one of the questions on the written emmination. Q: "Present
in outline form the points which should be covered in a forty-minute speech to a group of
trained social workers on the contributing factors to juvenile delinquency." A: "Anyone
who spent 'forty minutes' talking to a group of trained social workers on the subject of
the 'factors contributing to juvenile delinquency' would be wavstcing [sic] their time, as
well as his own, unless he were a politician running for office." Respondent's Reply
Brie p. 3.
S. Each candidate was interviewed by two well-qualified examiners, who rated him,




b. 'Voice and Speech
Intellectual Factors
c. Alertness
d. Judgment (Depth and maturity
of thinking.)
e. Ability to express ideas
Emotional Factors
f. Poise (Emotional adjustment,
stability.)
g. Social adaptability
(Ability to meet people, make
social adjustment.)
Professional Development
h. Orientation in the field
(Knowledge of new trends
and current problems.)













The qualitative entries were translated to numerical value according to a fixed formula
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was preserved, the court upheld Almassy's complaint on the ground that
the record was inadequate for purposes of review.9 In addition, the compet-
itive principle was held to be violated by the Commission's failure to pro-
vide "objective standards," exemplified by "definitions of the various
'personal fitness' factors" and "criteria for distinguishing between the
various levels of evaluation." While the court did not prohibit oral examina-
tions, it did, in effect, erect a presumption against the validity of the Com-
mission's findings, thus condemning prevailing civil service methods of
oral testing.10
In the review of a test which measures intangible factors of personality,
the extent of the record is limited by practical considerations. Stenographic
reproduction and notation of visible details afford only impersonal evi-
and the resultant grades of each examiner were averaged for a composite mark. For
other sample rating forms, see OnRwAY's RE'oRT, at 168-74.
9. This result, in view of the facts, see note 7 supra, seems most surprising. The
trial court, in finding for the Commission, had taken very little evidence which would
support the appellate court's decision. The Commission's "record," referred to by the
court, consisted of an application blank, a General Qualifications Appraisal Record blank,
and a blank form for a confidential report by the candidate's department head. No evi-
dence appeared, in the trial court's proceedings, pertaining to appeal procedure employed
by the Commission, to references and recommendations considered by the Commission, to
instructions given to examiners, or to the appellant's original application or department
head's report. No testimony of examiners or appellant concerning his ratings was pre-
sented. Nevertheless, the trial court was reversed and the entire examination and corre-
sponding eligible lists promulgated thereon invalidated. Brief for City Attorneys of Los
Angeles as Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondent's Petition for Hearing in the
Supreme Court after Decision by the District Court of Appeal, pp. 20-2. Hearing granted,
Almassy v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission, 33 Adv. Cal. Rep. No. 15,
Min. p. 2, Feb. 17, 1949.
With reference to the court's invalidation of the use of confidential department head
reports, see generally COMMIssIoN OF INQUIRY ON PUBLIC SERVICE PERSONNEL, MINUTES
OF EVIDENCE passim; PROBST, SERVICE RATINGS (1931) ; PROBST, MEASURING AND RATING
EMPLOYEE VALUE (1947). For a British viewpoint, see ROYAL COMInSSION ON THE CIVIL
SERVICE, Questions 1266, 1270, 1363 (1929-31).
10. The demand for "objective standards" would, at first glance, seem most justifiable,
But personnel experts, constantly striving for a greater degree of objectivity in the selec-
tion process, have never been able to formulate standards sufficiently precise to satisfy the
California court. See sources cited in note 3 supra. Likewise, the requirement of an "ade-
quate record" is fulfilled in only a few jurisdictions. Communications to the YALE LAW
JOURNAL from several state and local civil service commissions, including those of Illinois,
Texas, Detroit and Los Angeles, indicate that the interview records they maintain are
similar to that in the Ahnassy case. On the other hand, the New York City Civil Service
Commission employs stenotypists or phonographic recordings for their orals, Communica-
tion to the YALE LAW JOURNxAL from S. H. Galston, Director, Examining Division, May
16, 1949. "Most of the civil service commissions in conducting oral examinations do not
go much beyond requiring the oral examiners to keep an informal record of their comments
and criticisms on which their ultimate ratings or appeals are based. In most instances
the cost of transcribing oral examinations either through stenographic transcription or
through recordings would be beyond their ability to finance." Communication to the
YALE LAW JOURNAL from H. Eliot Kaplan, former Executive Secretary, National Civil
Service Reform League, May 5, 1949.
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dence, out of context; 11 mere description of a candidate's remarks and his
clothes fails to give any indication of "alertness" or "poise." Nothing short
of sound motion pictures would satisfy the court's conception of a "record
. . .showing basis of rating;" yet the resulting expense would be pro-
hibitive.12 Clearly, then, the record alone cannot adequately testify to the
validity of the ratings. And there is no compelling reason why it should,
for its primary purpose is to expedite the privilege of appeal within the Com-
mission. Here the record is not the sole basis for judgment. Confronted by
the candidate, his examiners and the record, an expert Review Board can
determine the soundness of ratings by comparing the testimony and evi-
dence with its own observations.' 3 Reasonably, the extent and nature of
the record to be used by the Review Board for this purpose are determina-
tions which the Civil Service Commission should make. Then, if the rat-
ings are litigated, the court should review in a manner similar to that of the
Board rather than confine itself to weighing the bulk of a meaningless rec-
ord.
The Almassy mandate for definitive gauges of "objectivity" stems from
a literal interpretation of the New York ruling in Fink v. Finegan.1 In that
leading case the court, invalidating an interviewing board's conclusion that
the candidate "lacked force and executive ability," stated that "a test or
examination, to be competitive, must employ an objective standard or
measure." '5 This declaration has become axiomatic in the few courts
11. "Isolated bits of evidence (gestures, expressions, reported incidents) which can
be exactly specified in the record are likely not to be significant bases of our estimates of a
candidate's qualifications. It is the composite picture which is revealing... To set down
the separate observations and then mechanically to rate them gives the appearance of
objectivity and may satisfy a court, but has little promise, in my opinion, of achieving
genuinely valuable appraisals of candidates.... If we place the emphasis on trying to
satisfy legal requirements for review, I fear we shall merely induce interviewers to record
elaborate observations which serve as convenient excuses for their ratings-and worse,
we may cause the interviewers to shy away from some of their conclusions ... simply
because they are unable conveniently to specify items of evidence which led to the final
evaluation." Statement of Dr. Arthur XV. Kornhauser, quoted in OannV's RF-i.m, at
131. But see Mos-R & KINGSLEY, op. cit. supra note 3, at -1.
12. See ORwAv's REPoar, at 128.
13. Id. at 130, 133-40. The author notes, however, that, because of the difficulties at-
tached to the maintenance of an adequate record, many jurisdictions make no provisions
for appeal from oral test ratings. They feel that it only encourages futile argument; there
can be presented no proof of error in the application of judgment to evidence which dis-
appears when the candidate leaves the room. For a recommended appeal procedure, see 3
Los AxGELEs BUDGEr AND 1EFFICIEcY BumEu, RFxORT OF ADmi.,ISTRATn- SunRvzv" OF
THE CIvIL SERvicE DEPA XTiEt 40-1, 77 (1947).
14. 270 N.Y. 356, 1 N.E.2d 462 (1936). See Levanthal, Adnzinislrati "o Law in Ncw
York Civil Service Litigation, 15 Forn. L. Rmv 62, 72 (1946).
15. Fink v. Finegan, 270 N.Y. 356, 1 N.E.2d 462 (1936) ; accord, Bridgman v. Kern,
257 App.Di-. 420, 13 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1st Dep't 1939), aff'd, 2 2 N.Y. 375, 26 N.E.2d 299
(1940) (but see discussion of the case by Kaplan, Civil Scricc-Rciew of Oral Exani-
natioas, 5 LiA. Norms oN LocAL GoVT 286 (1940)).
But cf. Lehman, J., in Sloat v, Board of Examiners, 274 N.Y. 367, 373, 9 N.E2d 12,
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which have attempted to review civil service examinations." It derives from
the assumption that a process involving extensive subjective judgment,
vulnerable to conscious and unconscious prejudices, cannot be a true test
of excellence." But this academic conception overlooks reality. Even on
essay-type college and bar examinations, grades depend in large measure
upon the mood and character of the scorers, and may vary over a wide
range.'8 The variations follow inevitably from the disparity of human minds.
Even if bias were present, it would be undetectable when kept within reason-
able bounds. Yet few would assert that the element of competition was not
present. If "objective" connotes a modus operandi impersonal in nature
and unconditioned by the mind, 9 it is difficult to see how the oral examina-
tion can legally remain in the civil service selection process.
Continuation of competitive personal interviews for civil service employ-
ment is dependent upon a careful balancing of its values and its dangers.
Where integration of mental and social attributes is essential to successful
job pdrformance, failure to consider relevant personality traits contravenes
the merit principle. But if such an appraisal is allowed, it must not be en-
ervated by constrained adherence to rigid standards of "objectivity." 11
15 (1937) : "The mandate of the Constitution for the ascertainment of merit and fitness,
so far as practicable, by competitive examination, may not be transformed into an interdict
against the examinations which are best adapted for the demonstration of fitness. It
would be impossible to formulate a standard by which such qualities may be defined or
measured with entire objectivity. The law does not require the impossible or forbid the
reasonable .... Much must be left here to the judgment of the examiners. The test
cannot be wholly objective and to the extent that it is subjective the result may depend
as much upon the fitness of the examiners as upon the fitness of the candidate. That is a
risk inherent in all systems of examination." Accord, Farrell v. Kern, 17 N.Y.S.2d 934
(Sup. Ct. 1940). These cases have modified the Fink doctrine as to require a clear demon-
stration of arbitrariness.
16. In addition to the numerous New York cases, see, e.g., Wilson v. Los Angeles
County Civil Service Commission, Civil No. 543,297, Los Angeles County Super. Ct., Sept.
23, 1948, p. 21; State ex rel. Kos v. Adamson, 226 Minn. 177, 185, 32 N.W.2d 281, 283
(1948). Thus far, these are the only states which have had to take a stand on the problem
raised by the Fink case.
17. See Fink v. Finegan, 270 N.Y. 356, 361-3, 1 N.E.2d 462, 464-5 (1936).
18. For a careful summary of investigations on the comparison of marks alloted to
examination papers by independent examiners and boards of examiners, together with a
section on a viva voce examination, see HARToG, AN EXAMINATION OF EXAMINATIONS
(1936). See also KLmN, CIVIL SERVICE IN PUBLIC WELFAR 167-8 (1940).
19. WmsmEa's NEW IxNTmATIONAL DICTioNARY 545 (1947). It should be noted
that if oral examinations ever achieved the dictionary definition of "objectivity," it might
be at the expense of "reliability" and "validity." Yet these are equally important criteria
for verifying data. If they are not satisfied, the effectiveness of oral examinations would
be seriously impaired. See PFIFFNER, RESEARcH METHODS iN PUBLIC ADMXNISTRATIOu1
153-5 (1940).
20. See note 19 mipra. If, as the Alnassy decision suggested, substantial uniformity
of questions is a necessity, superficial evaluation will be engendered. Such standardiza-
tion would not only facilitate "cramming" and memorization of answers, but would also
hamper insight into personality by its lack of flexibility..
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Formulation of a precise, valid measure to distinguish between "accept-
able poise" and "good poise" is clearly impossible. The evaluation thrives
on the flexibility of the examiner's judgment and the wealth of his exper-
ience. 21 Admittedly, the absence of a yardstick for reviewing these judg-
ments opens the door to personal and political prejudice, and might destroy
fair competition. But a realistic analysis indicates that corruption in civil
service is not rampant, 22 that scientific methods are employed,2 3 and that
controls are adequate..2 4 Accordingly, due respect for the importance of
oral examinations warrants recognition that the presence of subjectivity is
less reprehensible than the consequences of inadequacy in selecting pros-
pective public servants.
In the absence of palpable illegality, courts generally hesitate to upset
administrative determinations and procedures in internal governmental
operations. 25 Yet, any court following the Alnassy reasoning can find a
lack of "objectivity" in existing oral examinations. -: Perhaps a de-emphasis
21. See sources cited in note 23 in!ra.
22. See ELE=xTS OF PuBLic Ammsmr STn o 44S-77 (Marx ed. 1946).
23. See Bix.HAm & fOORE, How To Ix=ERvsv 127-39 (1941); OnnwD w's Ronar,
at 86-109. A brief and interesting account of the training of examiners by means of trial
interviews, whereby common man-to-man standards of rating are adopted, is found in
44 U.S. Cvn SEvicE Com-assiox- A.zN. REP. 37-42 (1927).
24. E. g., grading by two or more examiners, provisions for review within the Com-
mission, resort to the courts in cases of fraud or caprice. In addition, the careful selection
of interview boards should assure honest conduct of oral tests. See STr,=i Pznno:x l.
BoARD oF ALABkI-A, AMirr SYSTrm HANDBOOK (Revised Rules) Rule VI, §8 (1941);
and sources cited in note 3, upra.
25. E.g., Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290 (1900) (refusing to review dismissal
of clerk by Secretary of the Interior for "inefficiency") ; Friedman v. Schwellenbach, 159
F.2d 22 (App. D.C. 1946), cert. deided, 330 U.S. 833 (1947) (refusing to review discharge
of War Manpower Commission division chief after a finding that reasonable doubt existed
as to his loyalty) ; Levine v. Farley, 107 F2d 186 (App. D.C. 1939), cert. dericd, Z3S
U.S. 622 (1940) (refusing to review dismissal by Post Office Department for publishing
statements "tending to bring the service into disrepute"). For the application of this
principle to civil service tests, see Cowan v. Reavy, 2 83 N.Y. 23Z 234, 23 N.E2d 390
(1940); Maxwell v. Civil Service Commission, 169 Cal. 336, 339, 146 Pac. 871 (1915)
("They may decide a particular question wrong-but it is their question. Such boards
are vested with a high discretion and its abuse must appear very clearly before the courts
will interfere.")
26. See note 10 supra. But cf. Snyder v. Finegan, N.Y.Sup.Ct., Srzc.Term, 1937,
aff'd me., 253 App.Div. 707, 1 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1st Dep't 1937), aff'd mem. Sub. nom.
Snyder v. Kern, 278 N.Y. 665, 16 N.E.2d 394 (1938). "It was developed at the trial that
the ratings of the three commissioners on some of the factors differed as wide as the
poles. On some factors such as exercise of good judgment, poise, .etc. one commissioner
rated Snyder as low as 407o, while another commissioner rated him as high as 35q. In
spite of this, the Court nevertheless upheld the oral e.-amination as sufficiently competitive
and within the province of the Commission .... If ever there was a case which, in my
judgment, warranted the Court in setting aside the oral e:mmination as ladring in com-
petitive objectivity, it was the Snyder case ... . Communication to Andrew 0. Porter,
Deputy County Counsel in the Ahuassy case, from H. Eliot Kaplan, former Executive
Secretary of the National Civil Service Reform League, February 23, 1949.
